Part 4: Support for school boards at risk of poor performance

Ministry of Education: Monitoring and supporting school boards of trustees.

4.1
In this Part, we discuss the support provided to boards that have been identified as being at risk of poor performance – in terms of the welfare or educational performance of their students, or school operations.

Our expectations

4.2
We expected the Ministry to:

  • have effective systems for supporting boards at risk;
  • intervene in a timely and controlled way with boards deemed to be at medium or high risk;
  • monitor whether statutory interventions have lifted the performance of boards at risk and take alternative action if results are not satisfactory; and
  • incorporate in policies and procedures the lessons learned from past statutory interventions.

Support for school boards at risk where a statutory intervention is not considered necessary

4.3
We expected the Ministry to have effective systems for supporting boards at risk, and we expected the systems to include:

  • a range of types of support;
  • processes for identifying the type of support required;
  • processes for delivering the appropriate support in a timely and consistent way; and
  • processes for assessing the effectiveness of the support provided.

Types of support

4.4
The Ministry has a number of options for providing a board with support. These range from training and informal support to various types of statutory interventions (see Figure 2). Overall, the Ministry budgeted $1.46 million for informal support1 and statutory interventions2 for boards in 2007/08.

Identifying the type of support required

4.5
There is no overall guidance available for Ministry staff to help them to decide when and what support they should give to boards at risk. Regional offices assess the support required on a case-by-case basis. Assessment generally includes a team discussion and analysis of information on the school. Ministry staff use professional judgement to identify the degree of risk and determine what type of support they should provide. One office has invested in a case management approach and intervention logic tools,3 which are used to decide what support to provide and when.

4.6
We were not able to ascertain from our review of the Ministry's files on schools when support (other than statutory intervention) was offered to boards and what “trigger” prompted the offer of support. There was usually little material on the Ministry's files on schools recording the justification for the type of support provided or evaluating the outcomes of the support (unless a statutory intervention was later used at a school).

4.7
The files had more information on the logic for using statutory interventions than for using informal support. Reports on each statutory intervention covered issues causing concern, the justification for statutory intervention, and what type of intervention was appropriate. The main triggers for statutory intervention were usually financial issues, poor ERO reports, and personnel management problems. Other evidence of risk included inadequate planning and policies, poor community relationships, and a failure to comply with legislation.

Providing boards with informal support

4.8
In 2007/08, each regional office received departmental funding of $50,000 (including GST) and Crown funding of $67,000 (including GST) for informal support.

4.9
The regional offices use the departmental funding to support individual schools and regional projects. For example, in the southern region $25,000 was put aside for funding individual schools and $25,000 to fund other projects (such as strengthening kura and Pasifika networks, and identifying and training support specialists for informal and formal support). In 2006, most of the money planned for other activities was spent on providing informal support to schools and very little was spent on other projects.

4.10
The regional offices use the Crown funding solely to support schools. Spending this money is at the discretion of the regions. It can be used for a wide range of activities – for example, independent investigation of issues causing concern in a school, a mentor to support a principal, accounting services and financial reviews, independent principal appraisals, and a curriculum review.

4.11
The Ministry also has the capacity to approve support costing more than $5,000. This is sometimes called “formal support”. The national office manages the funds for this. During our audit, we found only one instance when this type of support was given to a board.

Timeliness and effectiveness of support

4.12
We were unable to assess the timeliness or effectiveness of the informal support provided. As noted in paragraph 4.6, there was little information on the Ministry's files on schools recording the justification for the type of support provided or evaluating the outcomes of the support (unless a statutory intervention was later used in a school).

4.13
There was little written evidence that the Ministry encourages consistency between offices or sharing of good practice. Quarterly meetings are held for the staff involved, but notes of the meetings were not kept until February 2008.

Intervening where school boards are at medium or high risk

4.14
We expected the Ministry to intervene in a timely and controlled way with boards deemed to be at medium or high risk.

4.15
The system for statutory interventions is set out in Part 7A of the Act. The purpose of statutory interventions is to “address risks to the operation of individual schools or to the welfare or educational performance of their students” (section 78H). Options include:

  • the Secretary requiring information (section 78J);
  • the Secretary requiring a board to engage specialist help (section 78K);
  • a requirement by the Secretary for a board to prepare and carry out an action plan (section 78L);
  • the Secretary appointing, at the direction of the Minister, a limited statutory manager (section 78M);
  • the Minister dissolving a board and directing the Secretary to appoint a commissioner (section 78N(1)); and
  • the Secretary dissolving a board and appointing a commissioner (section 78N(3)).

4.16
The Minister or Secretary can apply any of these statutory interventions provided there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is a risk to the operation of the school or to the welfare or educational performance of its students. The Minister or Secretary is required to apply whichever statutory intervention they consider reasonable to deal with the risk without intervening more than necessary in the affairs of the school (section 78I).

4.17
Figure 5 shows statutory interventions in place as at 30 September 2007.

Figure 5
Statutory interventions in place at 30 September 2007

Type of statutory intervention Northern Central North Central South Southern Total
Requirement to provide information 0 0 0 0 0
Specialist help 5 8 7 2 22
Action plan 1 0 1 0 2
Limited statutory manager 11 17 6 10 44
Commissioner appointed by the Minister 5 6 1 2 14
Commissioner appointed by the Secretary 4 5 3 1 13
Total 26 36 18 15 95
Estimated percentage of schools in that region 3.7 5.6 3.3 2.2 3.7

4.18
Some of the statutory intervention options, such as the requirement to provide information and prepare an action plan, are infrequently used. However, Ministry staff advise that they can usually obtain information easily from schools without the need for a statutory intervention. Also, the ERO often uses an action plan approach when it first identifies issues with a school. This can be used instead of the action plan required as a statutory intervention under section 78L.

4.19
The Ministry has set up policies and systematic procedures for deciding on and proceeding with a statutory intervention. This includes identifying the issues causing concern, identifying the type of intervention required, setting goals for the statutory intervention, and ensuring that legislative requirements are complied with. Staff at the national office carry out peer reviews and process the necessary approvals for all statutory interventions. Our sample of files from the regional and local Ministry offices we visited confirmed that these policies and procedures are usually followed in a systematic way. Figure 6 sets out a typical example of how statutory interventions work.

Figure 6
Case study of a typical statutory intervention

The issues causing concern were that:
  • the roll had declined to where the viability of the school was under threat;
  • the board was inexperienced;
  • there were recurring personnel issues, including some poor appointments and complaints about serious staff misconduct; and
  • high cash reserves were not designated for a particular purpose.
An ERO report in December 2002 recommended statutory intervention to provide the board with support to improve its performance in personnel management and student safety.

Informal support had previously been provided. A school adviser was employed to assist the school management and the board, and training had been provided for the board. However, the board and school did not act on the advice.

In December 2002, the Minister appointed a limited statutory manager under section 78M of the Act. The limited statutory manager was responsible for:
  • resolving the personnel issues;
  • ensuring that the board developed effective policies and procedures for managing complaints and personnel; and
  • improving the board's capacity to deal with personnel issues and manage complaints.
The statutory intervention was reviewed after the first year and continued, because not all outcomes had been achieved.

Another ERO report 17 months after the earlier one noted that the board and the limited statutory manager had made good progress on these issues but that more needed to be done to ensure that the progress was sustainable.

The statutory intervention was revoked in December 2005 because the outcomes sought through the intervention had been achieved:
  • the board had received training in personnel management;
  • policies for managing complaints and personnel procedures were in place; and
  • the board was refocused on improved outcomes for students.
A 2006 ERO report concluded that the board was governing the school satisfactorily.

Appointing people to carry out statutory interventions

4.20
An important aspect of implementing statutory interventions is appointing people to carry out the intervention. The capacity of the statutory appointee to work with the board and school management is a vital component of making the statutory intervention successful. Each regional or district office has a group of people it can call on. In some areas, Ministry staff indicated that it was hard to get enough people.

4.21
The Ministry did not provide evidence of a transparent procedure for how people who are available to do statutory intervention work are included in the group. Some concerns were raised in interviews about there being little transparency about how people are appointed to the group and the limited number of people available. It is unclear whether this acts as a disincentive for the Ministry to intervene or affects the length of time it takes to intervene.

4.22
However, the process for appointing a person to carry out a particular statutory intervention was more transparent. Ministry reports on the statutory intervention usually identify the skills required and who might be suitable for the job.

Timeliness of statutory interventions

4.23
As discussed in paragraphs 3.44-3.46, we found no guidance on how quickly a statutory intervention should be used once risks are identified. Our file reviews indicated that it can be three or more years between a school being identified as potentially at risk and a statutory intervention being used to resolve the problems. Practice varied from one statutory intervention to another. In our interviews, some people thought that the Ministry intervenes too quickly, while others thought that it leaves it too late.

4.24
In a few cases, statutory interventions seemed to continue even though little progress had been made towards achieving the objectives of the intervention, possibly because it was difficult to plan a way to end the intervention, or because the intervention was not effective. In these situations, the Ministry needs to carefully consider whether the statutory intervention will succeed and, if not, decide on an alternative course of action.

Monitoring progress of statutory interventions

4.25
We expected the Ministry to monitor whether statutory interventions have lifted the performance of boards at risk, and we expected the Ministry to take alternative action if results were not satisfactory.

4.26
Statutory appointees are required to produce monthly reports for the boards and the Ministry. However, our file reviews show that this did not always happen. Some reports were not on file, though Ministry staff advised that they often kept in touch verbally with statutory appointees.

4.27
The content of monitoring reports from statutory appointees varied. There was more focus on the activities completed rather than progress made or outcomes achieved.

4.28
The use of alternative actions during statutory interventions varied. Interviews with Ministry staff established that decisions are influenced by the particular situation at each school. There is evidence that statutory interventions are escalated, for example, from a specialist adviser to a limited statutory manager, if required. Some statutory interventions are also reduced as goals are achieved. Our audit confirmed that, in most cases, informal forms of support had been used before the statutory intervention.

4.29
Ministry procedures require a review of a statutory intervention at one-year intervals. This includes assessing progress towards the goals of the intervention and whether the board's performance is being lifted. In addition, the Ministry assesses progress towards the goals of the statutory intervention when it considers revoking an intervention. Our audit confirmed that this was done consistently.

4.30
Ministry procedures require ongoing monitoring of schools after a statutory intervention is completed. However, there was little evidence of this on the Ministry's files on schools. We are therefore unable to conclude that this was being done.

4.31
The Ministry has little information on how successful statutory interventions are in the long term. Since 2001, three schools (out of 227 completed statutory interventions) have had a repeat intervention after the previous one was completed. However, there is no information on whether this was the result of the effectiveness of previous statutory interventions or other factors altogether, such as the appointment of a new principal or board. In one instance, the Ministry had arranged for the ERO to assess the effectiveness of the statutory intervention.

Using lessons learned from statutory interventions

4.32
We expected the Ministry to incorporate lessons from past statutory interventions into policies and procedures.

4.33
There was little material documenting lessons learned from past statutory interventions. However, Ministry staff advised us that the main lessons they had learned were:

  • multi-level statutory interventions are more successful;
  • working with boards makes for more successful outcomes (as opposed to imposing support or a statutory intervention); and
  • getting the statutory appointee with the appropriate skills, knowledge, and personality to fit the particular situation is critical to a statutory intervention's success.

Our conclusions

4.34
The Ministry has some useful systems for supporting boards identified as at risk in terms of the welfare or educational performance of their students or school operations.

4.35
However, we were not able to establish that decisions to offer support, either informal support or statutory intervention, were made consistently and in a timely way for all boards. This is because systems and practices vary between Ministry offices. There is no overall guidance available for Ministry staff to assist them in deciding when and what support they should give to boards.

4.36
We are unable to provide assurance on the effectiveness of the informal support provided. This is because of the lack of material on the Ministry's files on schools recording the justification for the type of support provided or evaluating the outcomes of the support (unless a statutory intervention was later used in a school).

4.37
The Ministry has effective policies and procedures for managing statutory interventions once it intervenes. These are usually followed in a systematic way. However, we consider that the Ministry needs to improve its monitoring of statutory interventions and assessment of the effectiveness of statutory interventions. Monitoring procedures are not followed consistently, and there is a weak focus on outcomes. There is not enough information on the effectiveness of statutory interventions in the long term.

4.38
It is unclear whether the limited number of people available for implementing statutory interventions acts as a disincentive for the Ministry to intervene or affects the length of time it takes to intervene. However, a more transparent and open process for appointing people to the group would remove ambiguity around it and may result in the availability of more people for this work.

4.39
The Ministry needs to better document lessons from past statutory interventions to inform future practice.

Recommendation 7
We recommend that the Ministry of Education improve guidance for its staff on how to support school boards at risk of poor performance, and encourage consistent systems and best practice to provide boards at risk with timely support that is effective in resolving the issues and contributing to improved governance of schools.
Recommendation 8
We recommend that the Ministry of Education document and make transparent the process for appointing people to the group available to carry out statutory interventions.
Recommendation 9
We recommend that the Ministry of Education put in place a more systematic monitoring and evaluation framework for statutory interventions so it can assess the effectiveness of statutory interventions in improving a school board's capacity to govern.

1: The Ministry defines this as “costing less than $5000 per contract at any one school”.

2: These are defined in section 78I of the Act.

3:These are methods or techniques for analysing information and making decisions.

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